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Abstract
Ontological considerations in the study of Logic
Studying logical thinking requires a more than logical diversity within creation. As 
a consequence, an answer has to be given to the issue regarding the cohering 
diversity given in reality. All monistic -isms should be seen as attempts to give a 
negative answer to this question. The legacy o f Reformational philosophy, 
however, does make it possible to address these issues with the aid o f its theory o f 
inter-modal coherences. This theory is articulated in terms o f retrocipatory and 
anticipatory moments o f coherence (called analogies). It enables one to come up 
with an evaluation evincing both a sense o f critique and a sense o f solidarity with 
what is called -  in certain contexts o f the philosophy o f science -  "epistemic 
values ”, In addition it provides one with a method to analyze the nature and scope 
o f fundamental logical principles -  viewed as modal analogies which at the law- 
side o f the analytical aspect o f reality refer to other aspects o f reality. In 
particular -  against the background o f certain starting points in Greek thought -  a 
closer account is given o f the controversial status o f the principle o f the excluded 
middle. In conclusion -  with reference to particular examples -  attention is given 
to various ways o f exercising critique.
1. Introductory remarks
In this article we proceed from the assumption that the ability to conceptualize, 
judge and argue presupposes the logical-analytical aspect of reality. It is the task 
of logic to use this facet of reality as its point of entry in analysing the rules 
governing (formal or informal) valid logical reasoning. These rules pre-suppose 
universal modal logical principles which are themselves dependent upon an 
inter-modal principle, namely that of the excluded antinomy.
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The structure of the logical aspect evinces its meaning only in coherence with all 
the non-logical aspects o f creation. This inter-modal coherence accounts for the 
unavoidability of using elementary basic concepts reflecting this inter-modal 
coherence. The methodological implication of this starting-point provides us with 
a new insight into the nature of logical principles, such as the principle of identity 
(principium identitatis), the principle of contradiction (principium contra­
dictions), the principle of the exluded middle (exlusii tertii) and the principle of 
sufficient reason {principium rationis sufficientis). Different forms of criticism 
should be accounted for -  such as immanent criticism, transcendent criticism, 
and transcendental criticism.
2. Continuity and discontinuity
In the contemporary philosophy of science there seemingly exists a tension 
between Kuhn’s emphasis on scientific revolutions and Holton’s pre-occupation 
with persistent themes. Although one may view the rise o f Reformational 
philosophy, in the Kuhnian sense of the word, as a scientific revolution, one is 
equally justified in claiming that this new philosophical perspective developed by 
giving an answer to basic issues in philosophy showing continuity with the rich 
philosophical legacy of the West.
In order to show that an analysis o f the place and structure of the logical aspect, 
as well as an account of the nature of logical principles, is dependent upon 
fundamental philosophical issues, we start by introducing some crucial distinc­
tions while dealing with the classical philosophical issue of the “coherence of 
irreducibles” .
3. The “coherence of irreducibles”
Perhaps one can claim that one of the most basic o f all philosophical problems 
concerns this issue of the “coherence of irreducibles” . One may consider all 
monistic approaches in philosophy and the special sciences as implicitly 
answering this question in the negative. Monistic pan-psychism (for example the 
views of Theilhard de Chardin), wants to reduce every phenomenon to a psychic 
perspective. In a similar way, the classical mechanistic approach in physics, 
following Galileo’s discovery of the kinematical law o f  inertia, has tried, at least 
in its main trend, to view all physical bodies exclusively in terms of mechanical 
movement.1 However, Planck’s discovery of the quantum and the establishment 
o f the second main law of thermodynamics, i.e. the law of non-decreasing entropy
1 The most comprehensive, but perhaps last attempt to reduce ail physical phenomena to 
kinematical movement, is found in the mechanics of H. Hertz -  he was the first to broadcast and 
receive radio waves and established that light and heat are eletromagnetic waves.
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(indicating the irreversibility of physical processes), revealed the untenability of 
this monistic mechanistic approach in modem physics.
What is normally referred to as “primitives” in logic and in foundational studies, 
indeed pertain to the “irreducibles” mentioned above. These primitives also re­
flect the inherent limitations of concept-formation and definition -  in the final 
analysis every definition can only define something in indefinable terms. When­
ever one tries to define a truly primitive notion, the inevitable result is circularity 
or (antinomic) reduction.
Zeno’s classical reasoning against the reality of movement is nothing but an 
attempt to define pure movement, a primitive notion in kinematics, solely in static 
spatial terms -  as if a moving body possesses from moment to moment a definite 
place in space. In his fourth fragment one reads: “something in motion neither 
moves in the space it is occupying, nor in the space it does not occupy” (Diels- 
Kranz, 1959-1960:B Fr.4). When a moving body is every moment of its 
“movement” at one specific place, it is after all at rest, since “being in one place” 
simply means “not being in motion”. It is not o f any help, as Descartes has tried 
to do, to define movement in terms of change o f  place (The Principles o f  
Philosophy, Part II, IV -  we shall return to this view in connection with 
immanent criticism and the difference between an antinomny and a logical 
contradiction).
One of the two substances distinguished by Descartes is characterized by the 
essential feature of extension. However, in one sense the extension of a body is 
nothing but its place. But if extension, i.e. its place, is the very essence of a body 
(cf. Med II), then the definition of movement as a change o f  place is antinomic: 
being essentially its place, no body could ever change place -  at least not without 
simultaneously abolishing its very essence!
Let us consider another example, that of historicism. According to historicism 
everything (law, morality, art, faith, language and so on) is taken up in the flow of 
historical change and is everywhere only comprehensible as elements of a 
historical process. Contrary to this claim we are used to speak about legal 
history, art history, economic history, and so on. But if law, art and economics 
are nothing but history, we in fact must deal with the contradiction of a historical 
history. Whatever is history, cannot have a history, and whatever has a history, 
cannot itself be history. The irony is that historicism, reducing every facet of 
reality to the historical mode, has thus eliminated the very meaning of history -  if 
everything is history, there is nothing that can have a history!
Thus far we have emphasized the irreducibility of primitive terms residing in the 
different universal modalities or aspects of reality. O f course they also display a 
remarkable coherence. To account for these inter-relationships, we provisionally
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have to overlook other differences between the natural aspects (number, space, 
movement, the physical, biotical and sensitive aspects) and the aspects typical of 
human activities (the logical, historical, sign-mode, social, economic, aesthetic, 
juridical, ethical and certitudinal aspects). Let us provisionally call these inter­
relationships “moments-of-coherence”.
Dependent on the specific place of an aspect, one may detect a number of 
“moments-of-coherence” within its structure. In a certain sense one can say that 
through its “moments-of-coherence”, a specific aspect reflects its coherence with 
all other aspects of reality. Consider the following inter-relations within the 
structure of the social aspect, social unity and multiplicity (relation with the 
numerical aspect); social sphere, coherence and stratification (relation with the 
spatial aspect); social endurance (relation with the kinematic aspect); social 
dynamics (relation with the physical aspect); social growth, differentiation and 
integration (relation with the biotic aspect); social sensitivity (relation with the 
emotional aspect); social concensus and conflict (relation with the logical aspect); 
social power (relation with the cultural aspect); social meaning, expression and 
interpretation (relation with the sign-aspect); social style (relation with the 
aesthetic aspect); social justice (relation with the juridical aspect); social integrity 
(relation with the ethical aspect); and social security or certainty (relation with the 
certitudinal aspect).
This representation might give the impression of a static scheme. However, the 
analysis of any inter-relationship is at once also a dynamic concern which 
constantly refers to other (not yet analyzed) “moments-of-coherence” . Consider 
for example the concept social order. This concept implies a unity in the 
multiplicity o f social norms that constitute a specific social order. To attain such a 
unity, the relevant office-bearer, as the competent organ, should constantly take 
care that, within his sphere o f competence, the necessary reformational changes 
take place in order to ensure the internal stability and solidarity of the life-form 
concerned, amidst whatever external changes that might occur.
From this brief discussion it should be clear that the problem of the coherence o f  
irreducibles not only pertains to the core o f philosophy, but simultaneously 
confronts the various special sciences with inescapable philosophical basic 
problems.
We now proceed to an analysis of the structure of analysis and the implied logical 
principles.
4. Epistemic values and the nature of analysis
Analysis comprises both an act of identification and an act of distinguishing. In 
Greek philosophy it was realized that these acts o f identification and dis­
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tinguishing are subject to the logical principles of identity and non-contradiction. 
Already Aristotle framed the principle of the excluded middle (Metaph.\057a33) 
which claims that any statement is either true or false.
Since the rise of the Baden School of neo-Kantian thought (Windelband/Rickert) 
the philosophical legacy of the West has become accustomed to speak about 
values instead of principles (or: norms). In particular, the application of rules is 
distinguished from evaluating (cf. Kuhn, 1977:331; Kuhn, 1984:379). Ac­
knowledging that they are not exhaustive, Kuhn (1984:373) mentions the 
following five values influencing theory choice', “accuracy, consistency, scope, 
simplicity, and fruitfulness”. In his discussion of epistemic values, McMullin 
(1983:11) follows Kuhn and also discusses the choice of a theory in terms of 
value-judgements which differ from the mere application o f  a rule. He preferably 
speaks about “epistemic values” and transforms the values mentioned by Kuhn by 
referring to them as “predictive accuracy, internal coherence, external consisten­
cy, unifying power and epistemic fertility”. To this list epistemic simplicity is 
added (McMullin, 1983:15-16).
It is clear that this way of dealing with “epistemic values” is dependent on under­
lying coherences between the analytical facet of theory formation and diverse 
non-analytic aspects o f our experience. For example, “fertility” first of all reminds 
us of a biotic phenomenon.2 Plants need “fertile soil” in order to grow properly 
and bear fruits. Analogously, theories may turn out to be “fruitful” by bearing 
“fruits” . We may refer to this state of affairs by saying that we encounter, in the 
value of epistemic fertility, a biotical analogy (a biotical “moment-of- 
coherence”) within the structure of theoretical thought, i.e. within the structure of 
(deepened) analysis.
Similarly, we may relate consistency to the logical principle of non-contradiction, 
which analogously reflect the meaning of being distinct, i.e. of the arithmetical 
meaning of a discrete quantity. Number shows its nuclear meaning by way of 
being a (distinct) multiplicity -  first of all evinced in the succession of natural 
numbers. Although logicism tries to deny the original arithmetical meaning of 
quantity by attempting to reduce it to a supposedly logical concept of classes, it 
does not escape from a petitio principii. Russell (1956:119) explains his logicistic 
aim in terms of his attempted logical “definition” of the number 2:
1 + 1 is the number of a class w which is the logical sum of two classes u and v
which have no common term and have each only one term. The chief point to
2 I am using the unfamiliar term biotic in stead of biological. Strictly speaking, bio-fogy is the 
scientific study of biotic phenomena. Similar abuses of this suffix is found in terms like psycho­
logical (in stead of psychical), socio-logical (in stead of social), and onto-logical (in stead of 
ontical).
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be observed is, that logical addition of numbers is the fundamental notion, 
while arithmetical addition of numbers is wholly subsequent.
We only have to consider his words “two classes u and v” to realize the 
circularity: where does he get hold of the notion “fwo”?3 He simply uses the 
number “2” in its original arithmetical meaning of quantity in order to distinguish 
the two classes u and v from each other to start with, and then wants to deduce it 
again from an act o f “logical addition”.4 If our notion of unity and multiplicity 
first o f all relates to arithmetical phenomena, then it is clear that the meaning of 
the logical principle of identity and non-contradiction as such analogically 
reflects this basic arithmetical meaning. Whatever is given as a discrete unity (as 
being distinct) is identical to itself (the basis of the principle of identity) and is 
different from whatever it is not (the basis o f the principle of non-contradiction).
5. The twofold nature of an analogy
The notion o f an analogy contains two elements: similarity and difference -  and 
these elements are closely connected with the nature of analysis as identifying 
and distinguishing. To be sure, one can only identify and distinguish on the basis 
both of similarities and differences. When we differentiate between life in a 
biotic sense and social life, we are simultaneously confronted with a moment of 
similarity: the term life, and with a difference: the difference between the 
“biotical” and the “social” . Surely, life in a biotic sense fundamentally differs 
from life in a social sense. Therefore, in this moment of similarity the difference 
between the social aspect and the biotic aspect reveals itself. It sounds almost 
paradoxical to say that two aspects show a similarity precisely in that moment 
which reveals the difference between them.
This kind o f a “difference in terms of similarity” may be called a (modal) 
analogy.5 Surely, modal analogies are not the only kind of analogies which one
3 Already in 1910 Cassirer criticized this circularity (see Cassirer, 1969:67-68) “Die Be- 
stimmung der Zahl durch die Aequivalenz von Klassen setzt voraus, dass diese Klassen selbst 
als eine Mehrheit gegeben sind” (“The determination of number by means of the equivalence of 
classes presupposes that these classes themselves are given as a multiplicity”). In connection 
with the similarity between classes Cassirer (1969:68) proceeds: “But even if we, according to 
this perspective, beforehand could have left aside the attempt numerically to differentiate the 
classes we are comparing with each other, then it is still presupposed that we have opposed the 
classes as wholes, and precisely by doing that should have conceived them as ‘two’ distinct 
(classes)”.
4 Singh (1985:76) also points out that Russell’s attempt makes him a victim of the “vicious circle 
principle”.
5 The term “modal” indicates the various “modes of experience”, i.e. the different functional ways 
in which we are able to experience reality. Traditionally this dimension of reality is related to
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can distinguish, since entities also evince differences in their moments of 
similarity. Our lingual ability to designate these entitary analogies, as distinct 
from modal analogies, is known to us in the form of metaphors (viz. “foot of the 
mountain”).6
In order to analyze the nature of logical principles we have to focus our attention 
on the modal analogies at the law-side of the logical aspect. As a guideline we 
now have the following two modal analogies: the logical principles of identity and 
non-contradiction (arithmetical analogies within the modal structure of analysis) 
and the mentioned value of epistemic fertility (representing a biotical analogy 
within the modal structure of analysis). From this perspective there is no ground 
to differentiate between these two values/principles in so far as they both display 
the same ontical structure -  they are examples of an inter-modal coherence 
between different modal aspects of reality.
An important part of the philosophy of Dooyeweerd is dedicated to an analysis of 
the inter-modal coherence between the different aspects of reality. Although he 
does not relate the principles of identity and non-contradiction to the arithmetical 
analogy present in identifying and distinguishing, he does explain the principium 
rationis sufficientis (thus named by Leibniz) in terms of the physical analogy 
within the modal structure of the analytical aspect (Dooyeweerd, 1996 II: 119).7 
Already in 1813 Schopenhauer explained the nature of this logical principle as 
follows:
As such it asserts that, if a judgment is to express a piece of knowledge, it must 
have a sufficient ground or reason (Grand); by virtue of this quality, it then 
receives the predicate true. Truth is therefore the reference of a judgment to 
something different therefrom. This something is called the ground or reason of 
the judgment... (see Schopenhauer, 1974:156).
properties which are different from entities (“substances”). Being alive and being social are two 
functional properties of human beings. Consequently we can also call modal analogies “property 
analogies”
6 In passing we note that a metaphor demonstrates two important things: (a) the difference 
between the logical mode and the sign-mode (or: the difference between concept and word), and 
(b) the foundational role of the logical mode in relation to the sign-mode. Simply think about 
the well-known example of a “boxing ring”. If the sign-mode of reality coincides with the logical 
mode, i e if it is not distinct from the logical mode, then this metaphor would be an assertion 
that a “square circle” exists! (Cassirer [1969:16] refers to this well-known example of an 
illogical concept -  stemming from Russell -  in an inverted form: a “round quadrangle” [“rundes 
Viereck”].)
7 Stafleu (1987:31) gives a related description of the nature of scientific prediction and 
explanation.
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We want to designate all analogies from other modal aspects revealing 
themselves within the logical-analytical mode in this way as modal logical 
principles. Only when these principles are given a positive form, i.e. when they 
are “positivized”, do we meet logical rules that could be applied, such as in the 
case o f the logical rules of classical Aristotelian predicate logic or those of 
modem symbolic logic (compare Copi, 1994 11:206-450).
The distinction between modal logical norms/principles/values and their con- 
cretization/positivization rests on the distinction between the determining and 
delimiting norm-side of the logical aspect and that which is correlatively factually 
subjected to this determining norm-side. Concepts, statements and arguments are 
factually subjected to the logical principles/norms. Only when we acknowledge 
this distinction is it possible to differentiate between logically correct concept 
formation, statements and arguments and illogical concept formation, statements 
and arguments.
The inter-relations at stake are sometimes extremely subtle and complicated. 
Assessing the status of the principle o f  the excluded middle would amply 
illustrate this claim.
6. The universal applicability of the principle of the 
excluded middle in question
It is known that Brouwer rejects the universal applicability of the principle of the 
excluded middle (partly) because his neo-intuitionistic mathematics identifies 
mathematical existence completely with what could be constructed. For this 
reason Brouwer (1919a:9) states that the issue concerning the validity of the 
principle of the excluded middle is equivalent to the question concerning the 
possibility o f solving mathematical problems (1919a:9). He says that whether, in 
the decimal expansion of it, infinitely many combinations of equal successive 
digits appear, must be viewed as uncertain. Heyting specifically uses examples 
concerning the occurrence of the sequence 0123456789 in the decimal expansion 
of Ti. Write down, for instance, the decimal expansion of n:
71 = 3.1415 ...
and the decimal fraction
p = 0.3333 ...
which breaks off as soon as the sequence 0123456789 occurs in the 
decimal expansion of it.8 By accepting the principle of the excluded
8 As yet it is completely unknown if this sequence (i.e., 0123456789) does occur in the decimal 
expansion of tt and there is no method known to determine its existence
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middle, the following must be correct: 
p = V3 or p * 1/3
According to the logic of intuitionism, the expression “U v (-U)” implies that we 
must be able to construct a proof for every mathematical statement U, or 
construct, by starting with the assumption that U is valid, a contradiction. But 
then, the same requirements must apply to the above-mentioned case. That is, 
however, impossible, for to prove one of the statements p = ’/3 or p *Vs, we must 
first of all be able to decide if the sequence 0123456789 does occur in the 
decimal expansion of it. Since our present state of mathematical knowledge does 
not allow this, intuitionism rejects the universal scope of the principle of the 
excluded middle -  whenever the infinite is at stake it is inapplicable.
With his arguments Brouwer convinced Ludwig Wittgenstein and Hermann Weyl. 
Wittgenstein (1968) explains his stance in terms of a similar example. It seems 
self-evident that the sequence 7777 either occurs somewhere in the decimal 
expansion of n, or it does not:
We want, that is, to quote the law of the excluded middle and to say: ‘Either 
such an image is in his mind, or it is not; there is no third possibility!’ -  We 
encounter this queer argument also in other regions of philosophy. ‘In the 
decimal expansion of n either the group 7777 occurs, or it does not -  there is 
no third possibility’. That is to say ‘God sees -  but we don’t know’. But what 
does that mean? -  We use a picture; the picture of a visible series which one 
person sees the whole of and another not. The law of the excluded middle says 
here: It must either look like this, or like that. So it really -  and this is a truism
-  says nothing at all, but gives us a picture (Wittgenstein, 1968:112, par. 352; 
cp. p. 127, par. 426.)
These examples are dependent on an underlying divergence which stand in 
relation to the opposing evaluation of the nature of the infinite by intuitionism and 
the other trends in modem mathematics.
Traditionally a distinction is drawn between the potential infinite (PI) and the 
actual infinite (AI). With reference to Aristotle (cf. Phys. 208a6), Cantor 
distinguishes between apeiron dunamei (ajceipov Suvapei) and apeiron hos 
aforisménon (ajceipov oq cupcopiopevov) (the PI and the AI). Cantors general 
description (1962:401) is:
We preferably refer to the PI where we encounter an undetermined varying 
finite magnitude that either increases beyond all finite limits ... or decreases 
beneath all finite limits of smallness ...; generally I always speak of PI when 
we consider an undetermined magnitude which allows for a numberless
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multiplicity of determinations.9 ... The AI, on the other hand, is to be seen as a 
quantity (Quantum) which is not varying, since it is firm and determined in all 
its parts, a genuine constant, although at the same time it surpasses every 
similar finite magnitude in size.
Cantor (1962:404) also refers to the PI as the “uneigentliches Unendliches” 
(“improper infinite”), since its reality is dependent on the AI which alone makes it 
possible.
In radical opposition to Cantor’s employment of the AI, Weyl (1946:9) supports 
Brouwer’s rejection of the AI:
Brouwer opened our eyes and made us see how far classical mathematics, 
nourished by a belief in the ‘absolute’ that transcends all human possibilities of 
realization, goes beyond such statements as can claim real meaning and truth 
founded on evidence.
The whole-part relation
The relevance of the distinction between the PI and AI for the principle of the 
excluded middle is first of all seen in relation to the notion of a totality or a 
whole. Cantor (1962:401) speaks about a “Quantum” which is “firm and 
determined in all its parts”, thus implying the nature of a whole or totality. When 
“all the parts” are present, a whole is totally given (cf. Foradori, 1933) -  and 
only when we have a whole is it possible to execute a division entailing an 
either/or. Clearly, therefore, if an infinite totality (the AI) is rejected by 
intuitionism, then also the applicability of the principle of the excluded middle in 
the case of the infinite cannot be upheld.10
Whereas it is not difficult to locate the most primitive meaning of infinity as 
belonging to our arithmetical intuition of one, another one, and so on without an 
end, i.e. endlessly, infinitely,*> it is not so clear why we have to distinguish this
9 Note that Cantor still uses the notion of a magnitude (a term with a geometrical descent), 
instead of (numerical) value.
10 Intuitionism prefers not to speak about a set in the traditional sense of the word. When a 
common mode of generation for its elements is defined it introduces the notion of a spread, and 
when a characteristic property of its elements is meant the term species is used (Heyting, 
1971:36). Of course, according to intuitionism, the law of the excluded middle does hold in the 
case offinite totalities.
11 In his chapter dealing with the “arithmetization of mathematics”, Voss (1913:33) refers to 
Husserl and Wundt in connection with the psychological notion of successive thought acts. It 
was W.R. Hamilton who, in a typical Kantian fashion, defined algebra as the “science of pure 
time” (1833). We shall argue below that the notion of time has a place in mathematics without 
understanding it in a psychological sense.
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primitive meaning of infinity (i.e. endlessness) from the meaning of the actual 
infinite.
Is there no logical continuity between the acceptance of an endless sequence and 
the nature of the actual infinity of this sequence?
Those committed merely to the acknowledgement of the potential infinite do not 
allow for any fashion of presenting the multiplicity of elements of such an endless 
sequence as being given at once, without any succession. Kaufinann (1968:144), 
for example, explicitly speaks about the unfounded supposition of “the actual 
infinite as a totality of discrete elements” .
At this stage it must be clear that our problem now concerns the question whether 
it is possible to reduce the notion of a totality (whole) to the quantitative meaning 
of number. The relation of a whole (totality) to its parts was already discovered in 
early Greek philosophy -  partially as a result from the discovery of incom­
mensurability by the Pythagorean thinker Hippasos of Metapontum (cf. Von Fritz, 
1965). The subsequent Eleatic school characterizes their new metaphysics of 
being in terms derived from our intuition o f  space -  embedded in a fundamental 
geomatrization of Greek mathematics. Zeno’s B Fragment 3 at once looks at the 
two sides of the whole-parts relation. The movement from the parts to the whole 
yields a finite number of parts adding up to the whole. The opposite direction 
entails the endless divisibility of a whole which implies that in this case the 
number of the parts is infinite. This perspective can also be used in support of the 
interpretation given to Zeno’s B Fragment 1 by Hasse and Scholz (1928:10-13). 
This first Fragment (which we inherited from Simplicius) states that if a multi­
plicity exists, then simultaneously it must be large and small; large up to infinity 
and small up to nothingness. Scholz and Hasse (1928:11) clarify this fragment by 
interpreting it as follows:
If it is permissible to conceptualize a line-stretch as an aggregate of infinitely 
many small line stretches, then there are two and only two possibilities. Every 
basic line segment either has a finite size (larger than zero), in which case the 
aggregate of line-stretches transcends every finite line-stretch; or the supposed 
line-stretches are zero-stretches in the strict sense of the word, in which case 
the composed line is also a zero-stretch, because the combination of zero- 
stretches can always only produce a zero-stretch, however large the number of 
zero-stretches used may be.
Besides the fact that we can render the two mentioned fragments of Zeno 
perfectly intelligible by using the spatial whole-part relation, further support for 
this understanding may also be drawn from the account which Aristotle gives of 
Zeno’s arguments (cf. Metaph. 233al3 ff. and 239b5 ff). One of the standard 
expositions of Zeno’s argumentation against the reality of motion is completely 
dependent on the employment of the spatial whole-part relation with its implied
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trait of infinite divisibility. Guthrie (1980:91-92) explains this argument by saying 
that according to Zeno
[mjotion is impossible because an object moving between any two points A 
and B must always cover half the distance before it gets to the end. But before 
covering half the distance it must cover half of the half, and so on ad infinitum. 
Thus to traverse any distance at all it must cover an infinite number of points, 
which is impossible in any finite time.
This spatial orientation explains why subsequent Greek thinkers explored still 
further the spatial whole-part relation. Anaxagoras claims that we are not entitled 
to speak about the smallest, since there always exists something smaller. That 
what is can never cease to be through continued division, no matter how far this 
process of division is carried through (B Fragment 3). And since no smallest can 
exist, it is impossible (for any part) to be separated and set on its own, because it 
must now as in the beginning, exist together with everything else (B Fragment 6). 
This “existence together/coherent existence” refers to the coherence of spatial 
continuity in which all (material) things are fitted. However, this continuity is not 
composed out o f discrete (separated) parts, as if they were cut apart by an axe (B 
Fragment 8).
Irreducibility of the totality-character of continuity
With these distinctions Anaxagoras not only anticipates the view of Aristotle, 
since he also provides modem intuitionistic mathematics with valuable insights. 
Weyl (1931:1) is most explicit about this heritage: “Yes, especially now, in the 
foundations of mathematics, we are everywhere invited immediately to go back to 
the Greeks”12. When he discusses the “present” state of mathematical knowledge 
in 1926 he (Weyl, 1926:1-2) starts with Anaxagoras. He often characterizes 
continuity in terms o f the whole-part relation (cf. Weyl, 1921:77, and 1966:74).
Intuitionistic mathematics here also follows fundamental insights from Aristotle. 
Although Aristotle analyzed both space and number within the perspective of one 
category, namely that of quantity (number is a discrete quantity and space is a 
continuous quantity), he nonetheless develops a remarkable insight into the 
structure o f spatial continuity. The parts of a discrete quantity possess no 
common boundary, whereas, in the case of a line (as a continuous quantity) it is 
always possible to detect a common limit o f its parts (Categoriae, 4b25 if., 5al 
f f ): “The act in which a continuous distance is divided into two halves takes one 
point twice since it is viewed as starting-point and end-point” (Physica, 263a23
12 “Ja gerade heute sehen wir uns genótigt, iiberall in den Grundlagen der Mathematik wieder 
unmittelbar auf den Griechen zuriickzugehen” (Weyl, 1931:1).
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if.).13 According to Aristotle it is therefore self-evident that “everything 
continuous is divisible into divisible parts which are infinitely divisible” {Physica, 
231bl 5 ff).
It is especially this trait of continuity that is taken seriously in intuitionistic 
mathematics. Weyl (1921:77) points out: “That it has parts, is a basic property of 
the continuum”, and adds: “ it belongs to the very essence of the continuum that 
every one of its parts admits a limitless divisibility” .
According to Weyl (1921:77), the general aim of Weierstrass, Dedekind and 
Cantor, namely to arithmetize spatial continuity completely, had to take recourse 
to the neighbourhood concept: “To account for the continuous coherence of the 
points, contemporary analysis, which has separated the continuum into a set of 
isolated points, takes refuge to the neighbourhood concept”.
However, it is not at all imperative to adhere to the intuitionistic approach in 
modem mathematics in order to realize that the totality-character of continuity is 
irreducible to numerical notions. Bemays (1976:74) did sense the irreducibility of 
the spatial whole-part relation (the totality-property of spatial continuity) with an 
astonishing lucidity: “The property of being a totality ‘undeniably belongs to the 
geometric idea of the continuum. And it is this characteristic which resists a 
complete arithmetization of the continuum’.14
In another context he even states that the classical foundation of the real numbers 
given by Cantor and Dedekind does not “manifest a complete arithmetization” 
(Bemays, 1976:187-188). To this he adds the remark: “It is in any case doubtful 
whether a complete arithmetization of the idea of the continuum could be 
justified. The idea of the continuum is any way originally a geometrical idea” 
(Bemays, 1976:188). His deeply felt reaction against the mistaken and one-sided 
nature of modem arithmeticism is best seen from his following remark:
The arithmetizing monism in mathematics is an arbitrary thesis. The claim that 
the field of investigation of mathematics purely emerges from the re­
presentation of number is not at all shown. Much rather, it is presumably the 
case that concepts such as a continuous curve and an area, and in particular the 
concepts used in topology, are not reducible to notions of number 
(Zahlvorstellungen)” (Bemays, 1976:188).
13 Cf. Foradori (1933:162, 166). Bóhme (1966:308 ff.) highlights the striking similarities between 
the Aristotelian conception of the continuum and the Cantor-Dedekind characterization thereof. 
He shows that although the latter employs the actual infinite -  totally rejected by Aristotle -  
they still conform to the two criteria which Aristotle developed for continuity.
14 "Und es ist auch dicscr Charakter, der einer vollkommenen Arithmetisiemng des Kontinuums 
entgcgenstcht” -  Bemays, 1976:74
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7. A crucial inter-modal coherence
Anothor way to phrase these considerations is to say that the fundamental 
difference between the potential infinite and the actual infinite stands and falls 
with the difference between the primitive meaning of an arithmetical succession 
(preferably designated as the successive infinite), and the totality-character of an 
actual infinite set (where all the elements are viewed as being present simul­
taneously). In the latter case it is preferable to speak about the at once infinite,15
It is also clear from Cantor’s notion of a set that he explicitly uses the feature of 
being a totality to characterize it: “We understand a ‘set’ to be any collection into 
a whole M of definite and distinct objects m of our intuition or our thought (which 
are called the ‘elements’ o f M [Cantor, 1962:282])” 16 Since the notion of a set 
and that of an element are indefinable terms in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, the 
formulation of the “Axiom of Infinity” gives the impression that only the 
successive infinite is intended (cf. Fraenkel et al., 1973:46). In particular, when 
the “Axiom of Infinity” is read in coherence with the “Axiom of Power-Set” (cf. 
Fraenkel et al., 1973:35), it is clear that together they (also) cover the case of 
infinite totalities (where all the subsets of an infinite set also constitute a new 
set).17
It must be clear that our argument does not introduce continuity in its irreducible 
spatial sense into the meaning of number. Much rather, we here need the above­
mentioned figure of a modal analogy, any arithmetical succession may, under the 
guidance of our spatial intuition o f simultaneity, be viewed as i f  all its elements 
are present at once -  in which case we have employed the regulative idea of the 
at once infinite, accounted for in terms of an anticipatory analogy of space within 
the meaning of number.
15 These terms were already used in the disputes of the early 14th century about the infinity of 
God. Compare the expressions infinitum successivum and infinitum simultaneum (Maier, 
1964:77-79).
16 “Unter einer ‘Menge’ verstehen wir jede Zusammenfassung M von bestimmten wohlunter- 
schiedenen Objekten m unserer Anschauung oder unseres Denkens (welche die ‘Elemente' von 
M genannt werden) zu einem Ganzen” (Cantor, 1962:282). In his description of the nature of 
“Teilmengen” (“subsets”) on the same page, the word “at once” (“zugleich”) is used con­
stitutively. A good discussion of Cantor’s concept of a set is found in Singh (1985).
17 We note in passing that it was the postulation of an infinite ‘class’ which showed the unten- 
ability of Russell’s logicistic project. In 1919 he had to admit that all of his earlier proofs for the 
existence of an infinite class are invalid (1919:134-135; cf. Morris, 1929:456). Fraenkel et al. 
(1973:186), remark: “It seems, then, that the only really serious drawback in the Frege-Russell 
thesis is the doubtful status of InfAx, according to the interpretation intended by them”.
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In other words, the use of the at once infinite (with its irreducibility to the 
successive infinite) stands and falls with the irreducibility of the spatial time-order 
of simultaneity which is simply the determining order for any coherent totality, 
since to constitute any spatial whole all the parts have to be present at once.
Remark:
Also in the aspects of number and space we have to distinguish between a 
law-side and a factual side. The former plays a limiting and determining 
role, whereas the latter is limited and determined by the order at the law- 
side. The history of time-measurement suggests that time should be seen as 
a unique dimension of reality which cannot be identified with the physical 
aspect o f reality. First of all time-measurement used the numerical time- 
order of succession -  by counting the days, the weeks, months and years. 
Then they used the spatial time-order of simultaneity -  with the aid of 
instruments like sundials. Subsequently, the kinematical order of constancy 
was used (cp. the regular swing of a pendulum in a mechanical clock­
work). Finally, in our century, we are using the irreversible physical time- 
order -  for example in atomic clocks and in the procedure used to 
determine the age of the different earth layers. This perspective continues 
insights of Descartes -  cf. his notion of numeros, ordo and duratio (cf. 
Becker, 1973:269) -  and Kant -  cf. his three modes of time namely suc­
cession, co-existence and duration (Kant, 1956.B-219). The acknowledge­
ment of time as a unique dimension of reality is also worked out by Stafleu 
in his analysis of the foundations of physics (cf. Stafleu, 1980:16, 83 ft).
In the development of Greek philosophy and mathematics it was conjectured to 
view our intuition of space as being more basic than that o f number. Fraenkel et 
al. (1973:213) remark:
Certainly the discrete admits an easier access to logical analysis, and the 
tendency of aritlnnetizaiion, already underlying Zeno’s paradoxes, has been 
impressing its mark upon modem mathematics and may be perceived in 
axiomatics of set theory as well as in metamathematics. However, the converse 
direction is also conceivable, for intuition seems to comprehend the continuum 
al once (my italics -  DFMS); mainly for this reason Greek mathematics and 
philosophy were inclined to consider continuity to be the simpler concept and 
to contemplate combinatorial concepts and facts from an analytic view.
Although we want to acknowledge the spatial descent of the notion of a whole 
and its parts,18 it must also be clear that the meaning of spatial continuity
18 In the light of this perspective the following remark of Bemays is quite understandable: “The 
idea of the continuum is a geometrical idea which is expressed by analysis in terms of arith­
metic” (“Die Idee des Kontinuums ist eine geometrische Idee, welche durch die Analysis in
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presupposes that o f number. Consequently, where the infinite divisibility of any 
spatial continuum refers back (retrocipates) to the primitive meaning of the 
successive infinite, the at once infinite refers forward (i.e. anticipates) to the 
spatial order o f  simultaneity with its factual correlate, the totality-character 
implied and determined by this order of at once.
8. The principle of the excluded middle: a retrocipation to 
an anticipation
Against the foregoing background we may now formulate the ontical status of the 
principle o f  the excluded middle. As such it is first of all a part o f the arithmetical 
analogy within the modal structure of the logical-analytical mode, intimately 
connected with the principles of identity and non-contradiction. To be sure, in the 
finite case, the bifurcation of A and non-A clearly excludes any third possibility.
However, in order to ensure the universal applicability of this logical principle, 
i.e. also in the case of the infinite, we have to acknowledge the (irreducible) 
meaning of the at once infinite, which itself is completely dependent on the 
irreducibility of the spatial order of simultaneity with its implied correlate: the 
whole-part relation.
Only under the anticipatory guidance o f the regulative hypothesis of the at once 
infinite are we justified in accepting that the principle o f  the excluded middle 
holds in the infinite case as well. In a striking way Hermann Weyl supports our 
claim by alluding to the at once infinite in connection with the claim that a 
number with a property P  exists or that all numbers implicitly have the opposite 
property non-/*: “The principle of the excluded middle for such sentences may be 
valid for God who surveys the infinite sequence of natural numbers, as it were, 
with one glance, but not for human logic” (Weyl, 1951:552).
Therefore, via the (retrocipatory) analogy of number within the structure of 
analysis, this principle finds its ultimate foundation in the numerical anticipation 
to the meaning of space, which entitle us to say that the ontical status of the
arithmetischer Sprache ausgedrúkt wird” ) Further on this page, in connection with short­
comings in the intuitionistic conception, he adds (Bemays, 1976:74) that it is precisely this 
totality-feature of the continuum which resists arithmetization: “This stems from the fact that on 
the intuitionistic conception, the continuum does not have the character of a totality, which 
undeniably belongs to the geometrical idea of the continuum. And it is this characteristic of the 
continuum which would resist perfect arithmetization” (“Das riihrt davon her, dass die in- 
tuitionistische Vorstellung nicht jenen Charakter der Geschlossenheit bezitzt, der zweifellos zur 
geometrischen Vorstellung des Kontinuums gehórt. Und es ist auch dieser Charakter, der einer 
vollkommenen Arithmetisierung des Kontinuums entgegensteht” -  Bemays, 1976:74).
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principle of the excluded middle is given in its being a retrocipation to an 
anticipation!
In other words, the meaning of the principle of the excluded middle is given in 
a retrocipation from the logical-analytical mode to the arithmetical mode, 
which in turn anticipates the factual spatial whole-part relation as subjected to 
and as determined by the spatial time-order of simultaneity.
We can expand our ontological considerations in order to account for another 
important distinction, namely that between contradiction and antinomy.
9. Contradiction and antinomy
The two “legs” of analysis, namely identification and distinguishing, analogically 
reflect the meaning of number within the structure of the logical aspect -  it 
presupposes the presence of a logical multiplicity and unity. The numerical 
succession of one, another one, and so on makes it possible to identify any 
moment in this succession and to distinguish it from any other one. In general one 
can say that logical contradictions are always confined to an intra-modal 
opposition -  for instance when two spatial figures are incorrectly distinguished in 
the illogical (i.e., logically contradictory) reference to a “square circle”. These 
two figures, namely a square and a circle, are enclosed within the modal structure 
of the spatial aspect. However, when Zeno tried to reduce the meaning of 
movement to that of statical positions in space, two different aspects are 
confused, i.e., then an inter-modal opposition, designated as an antinomy, is 
given.
It should be noted that such an inter-modal antinomy always implies a logical 
contradiction (which is intra-modal), but not vice versa. Descartes’ “definition” 
(i .e. reduction!) of movement as a “change of place” implies the following logical 
contradiction: if a body is its place, and if movement is a change o f  place, then a 
body can only move if it changes “essentially” -  implying that it cannot move (or, 
succintly: a body can move if and only if it cannot move).19
10. Once again the principle of sufficient reason 
(principium rationis sufficients)
We have seen that this principle finds its ontical basis in the physical (causal) 
analogy at the law-side of the logical aspect. Whereas the principles of identity, 
(non-)contradiction and the excluded middle operate within the confines of logic
19 This distinction between antinomy and contradiction was overlooked in Hart’s work: 
Understanding Our World (1984, cf. p. 132, 133),
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the principle of sufficient reason refers one beyond logic to the grounds (reasons) 
brought forward in support of specific conclusions.
This principle, originally formulated by Leibniz, was subjected to an extensive 
investigation by A. Schopenhauer in 1813. He called it the principle of sufficient 
ground of knowledge (principium rationis sufficientis cognoscendi):
As such it asserts that, if a judgement is to express a piece of knowledge, it 
must have sufficient ground or reason (Grund); by virtue of this quality, it then 
receives the predicate true. Truth is therefore the reference of a judgement to 
something different therefrom. This something is called the ground or reason of 
the judgement... (Schopenhauer, 1974:156).
Within the context of scholarly interaction all the mentioned logical principles 
play an essential role. Students entering (university) colleges are normally told 
that they should develop a critical mind, that they should not merely accept what 
is told to them by their teachers or text books. I want to reverse this maxim: 
before you can critique someone it is required what you consider praiseworthy in 
the thought of a scholar (philosopher or special scientist), thus first of all showing 
solidarity with that person, criticism is inadequate. The maxim is not to be 
critical, but to show a sense of critical solidarity! Vitalism did see something in 
reality worth of being acknowledged: the fact that our experiential world does 
include a biotical aspect. However, due to its over-emphasizing of this aspect, the 
very meaning of what was legitimately seen is distorted. The principle of critical 
solidarity requires that it is inadmissible to criticize a scholar before a positive 
assessment is given o f the fruitful insights this scholar advanced.
The crucial question now is: How do we side-step the “dead end” of ultimately 
merely positing our own alternative over against the view-point of someone else, 
without making any intrinsic “thought-contact”?
Factual and immanent criticism
When a particular theoretical approach to reality cannot do justice to undeniable 
“states of affairs”, one can confront it with the relevant data -  thus exercizing 
factual criticism. The dualistic anthropology of St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, 
believed that the human intellect (“mind”) could operate quite independent from 
any activity of the “body” . From what we today know about the substructures of 
human functioning, this dualism lacks any factual support. Every thought activity 
is dependent upon certain functions within the human brain, which, via the biotic 
substructure, ultimately pre-supposes a physico-chemical substratum.20
20 Although the brain embraces only 2% of the total mass of the human body, 25% of the body’s 
metabolism takes place within the brain
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Especially in scientific and scholarly interaction, another form of criticism is of 
fundamental importance: immanent critique.
This method could make use of all known valid forms of logical inference -  as 
long as the outcome is that the position criticized was found guilty of contra­
dicting itself internally. Immanent criticism must try to clarify the question 
whether the unveiled contradictions are evidence of an underlying antinomy.
Consider for example they way in which Descartes wanted to demonstrate that 
God exists.21 He argues that the idea of God as an infinite substance must, due to 
my finiteness, be caused by God himself (Med. III). This infinity of God is known 
(intelligi), not as a negation, but as a richer reality, in spite of the fact that we 
cannot comprehend (comprehendi) it. Descartes believes that in a dare et 
distincte manner he thus proved the existence of God, since whatever is clearly 
and distinctly conceived is true. The circularity (petitio principii) of this 
reasoning is seen as soon as we ask: what or who ensure the truth of clear and 
distinct understanding? To this question Descartes answers: God, since he cannot 
deceive us (Med. IV). Thus, to clearly and distinctly prove the existence of God, 
Descartes had to start from the assumption that God exists as the guarantee of 
clear and distinct reasoning!
A similar form of immanent criticism is uncovered by considering the idea that 
matter should be seen as the principium individuationis (principle of individua­
tion): everything numerous possesses matter (Aristotle, Metaphysica 1074). St. 
Thomas Aquinas followed Aristotle but encountered serious difficulties. This 
view, as such, did not imply immediate problems for Aristotle’s anthropology, 
since he considered only the combination of form  (soul) and matter (body) to 
constitute a substantial unity. St. Thomas, on the other hand, being influenced by 
the Platonic “proofs” concerning the indestructibility of the “soul”, wanted to 
safe-guard a separate (immaterial) existence for the soul as a substance, taken in 
full separation from the material body. By implication then, there must be a 
multiplicity o f  souls without any matter -  contradicting the mentioned Aris­
totelian claim that everything numerous possesses matter!
Nominalism demonstrates the fate of self-contradiction at a very basic level. It is 
convinced that outside the human mind there is no universality -  only strictly 
individual things exist in reality. However, in flat contradiction with this con­
viction, at least one universal trait is implicitly affirmed with regard to the 
multipicity of individual entities outside the human mind: their being-individual!
21 The impasse of historicism, mentioned above, as well as the argument of Zeno against 
multiplicity and movement (Achilles and the tortoise) are examples of antinomies which are used 
in the immanent criticism of these positions.
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In the case of an extreme materialism we find a crucial element of self-reference. 
The basic thesis is given in the statement: everything is matter. If this statement is 
true, then there must be something immaterial, namely the truth of the claim 
made! Similarly, the accepted (universal) physical laws are ultimately con­
ditioning material things -  but these conditions for the existence of material things 
are not themselves material.
The ontological considerations that guided our reflection up to this point pre­
cludes every attempt to postulate a mutual antagonism between different modes 
(or their analogies). Von Kibéd (1979) demonstrates this position with an appeal 
to the (logical) law o f identity. His aim is to account for the constancy of an entity
-  but he does that in terms of a static metaphysics'. “The principle of identity, 
according to which everything is only identical to itself, actually forbids every 
change, every becoming-different, every stepping-outside of a substance from its 
being-itself ’ (Von Kibéd, 1979:59).
He is well aware o f the fact that some thinkers (like Aristotle) employed the 
distinction between essence and appearance to account both for the identity and 
the change of an entity: “The difficulties accompanying the concept o f the 
changes of an unchangeable thing are side-stepped by dividing the entity into an 
essential and accidental part, thus producing the possibility to associate un­
changeability with its essence and changeability with what is accidental” (Von 
Kibéd, 1979:60). However, according to Von Kibéd (1979:60 this would not help 
us, because also the accidental features of an entity are subject to the law of 
identity: “according to the principle of identity also the accidental must remain 
identical to itself and cannot abolish its essence, which is given in its accidental 
nature”). His conclusion is therefore to be expected: “The concept of change is 
therefore logically unthinkable” (1979:60). What is needed in order to account for 
change, namely “the concept of causality, is logically seen non-transparent and 
shows the limits of logical explanation” (1979:60-61). Von Kibéd in fact provides 
us with a modem version of Zeno’s argument against the reality of movement (as 
change of place).
We conclude our discussion with a few remarks about the mentioned well-known 
arguments of Zeno against movement and multiplicity. We have stressed the 
irreducibility of the kinematical aspect in an earlier context. The antinomical 
implications of Zeno’s argument, echoed in Descartes’ definition of movement as 
a change o f  place, is clearly seen by a communist physicist, H. Hdrz. Hórz 
(1967) explains that classical physics teaches that a moving body finds itself at a 
specific moment at a specific place. In taking this position, so Hórz argues, 
classical physics precludes an account of the real movement that is at stake. 
Engels (the colleague and contemporary of Marx) gave a dialectical materialistic 
account of motion: any moving body is and is not to be located at a specific
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place. Hórz refers to this by speaking about the “dialectical antinomy” (dialec- 
tische Widerspruch) of movement. Explaining the position of Engels in a way that 
avoids every “logical contradiction”, Hórz (1967:11) states: in so far as the body 
is still moving it is not at a specific place, and in so far as it has arrived at its 
destination (as a result of its movement) it is at a specific place. Unfortunately 
Horz continues to see movement as a change o f place. He did not realize that the 
term “place” refers to the primitive meaning of the spatial aspect, whereas the 
term “change” refers to the primitive meaning of the physical aspect -  explaining 
why it is antinomical to “define” movement as a “change of place”.
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